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Introduction 
 
Since 1953 the Dutch constitution states that either the King (before 1983), or the government 
(since 1983), should promote and improve the international legal order. Article 90 in the 
constitution provides for this obligation. Based on of this article the government joined in a 
number of military missions around the world. The first mission was even before this article 
was introduced, during the Korean War in 1950 when the Netherlands joined the mission 
initiated by the Security Council and the United States. After this mission many several 
missions followed. The government has to decide whether or not the Dutch military will take 
part in an international military mission. But how does the government decide and what is the 
role of the Parliament in this decision? Members of Parliament (MPs) and ministers often 
describe these decisions as the hardest to make. Military peace missions tend to be dangerous 
and lives of soldiers are at stake, as seen in Korea where 125 Dutch lives were lost. The 
government’s decision whether or not to join a mission is difficult. 
As the Netherlands is a parliamentary democracy, one would expect that the 
Parliament has the greatest influence in the decision-making process. However, for a long 
time the government made key decisions with regard to foreign affairs and defence policies. 
But from 1950 onwards the role that Parliament plays in the decision making process on 
whether or not to join a mission appears to become increasingly important. During the 1970s, 
when it was decided to join the UNIFIL mission, the Parliament debated on the execution of 
the mission, but the fundamental question whether the Netherlands should join the mission 
was hardly debated. When the minister of Defence was asked why he did not ask Parliament 
whether UNIFIL should have been joined earlier, the minister answered simply that is was not 
a suitable question. Today this answer would be inappropriate and unimaginable, since in the 
1990s and 2000s changes were made to the constitution which required the government to 
follow a protocol on risk assessment. In the year 2000 Article 100 was added to the 
constitution, which required the government to inform the Parliament after deciding to join a 
mission. Over the years the decision itself remained legally a government matter, but in 
practice a shift was taking place. During the debates about later missions, such as the police-
training mission in Kunduz, Afghanistan, the government clearly asked for support in 
Parliament. This would be unimaginable during the 1950s and 1970s. It is a remarkable 
development since foreign affairs and defence historically where considered to be a matter of 
the government. This interesting history leads to the following research question: Why and 
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how did the role of the government and Parliament change in the decision-making process 
concerning/with regard to the Dutch military missions abroad after the Second World War?  
Theoretical Framework 
 
To explain the legitimacy of Parliament and government, and thereby establish a basis 
for this thesis, theories on legitimacy are crucial to discuss.  
Legitimacy is a widely discussed topic and different definitions are given. The main 
discussion is about what gives rulers the right to rule. Different authors have different 
perceptions of this and therefore many definitions on legitimacy exist. Max Weber (Beetham 
1991, 6) was an influential author within the debate on legitimacy, stating that legitimacy is 
the belief of the people in the legitimacy of their rulers. During the twentieth century critiques 
arose on the theories of Weber, arguing that legitimacy is not about the belief of the people, 
but that legitimacy consists of different elements. Rosanvallon, Beetham and Barker had a 
great impact on the debates on different forms of legitimacy.  
An important aspect in these discussions is the difference between legality and 
legitimacy, as Thomas Aquinas already pointed out long ago; a law can be proclaimed 
completely in accordance with the constitution, but if the people do not agree with that law, it 
will not be seen as legitimate (Bokhorst 2014, 19). This can also be observed when looking at 
Dutch military missions. The law is very clear: the government only has to inform the 
Parliament about the missions. No explicit approval of the Parliament is needed. During the 
last decades, however, it can be clearly observed that the government, with respect to Dutch 
missions abroad, not only informs the Parliament, but also asks for consent. The government 
is legally entitled to make the decision, but decides to ask for the opinion and approval of the 
Parliament.   
Beetham (1991, 15) states that the crucial idea of understanding legitimacy lies in the 
recognition that legitimacy is a multidimensional phenomenon. He states that power is 
legitimate when it conforms to three dimensions which all have their own characteristics.  
The first dimension is the conformity to rules; the second dimension is the 
justifiability in terms of shared beliefs and the third dimension is legitimation through 
expressed consent. These characteristics can all differ from each other and can be different in 
each case. The legitimacy of a decision, such has on participation in a military mission, 
depends on a judgement where all the different characteristics are considered (Beetham 2013, 
20). The dimensions, described above, are merely focussed on the connection between 
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legitimacy and the people, in other words, are the government and the decisions they take 
legitimate according to the people.  In one of the added chapters in the latest edition of his 
book however Beetham also discusses, next to these dimensions of legitimacy, the importance 
of the legitimation of governments by themselves (Beetham 2013, 254). 
Barker discusses the self-legitimation of governments, a subject touched upon by 
Weber, but further not widely discussed in the literature (Barker 2004, 5). Self-legitimation 
was not a very popular subject of research during the twentieth century in which the 
development and value of democracy was more fashionable. Only after the collapse of the 
communist states in Eastern Europe the debate was explored again. Legitimation is not only 
about whom the people prefer as ruler, but also about leaders who actively have to legitimize 
themselves. The leaders have to claim that they have a specific right to rule (Barker 2004, 24). 
Self-legitimation justifies and explains the actions of rulers to a large extent (Barker 2004, 
136). Rulers tend to legitimize themselves in the immediate environment of the government, 
such as the Parliament, but this does not mean that the other components of legitimacy and 
the people are not important. Self-legitimation is one of the activities of the government 
(Barker 2004, 137). Barker describes legitimacy as an activity of the government and not as 
an abstract quality (Barker 2004, 2). By performing certain important tasks a government can 
legitimize itself. A historical example of the activity of legitimation Barker gives is the 
coronation of the wife of Napoleon as the Empress Josephine. A famous painting made by 
Jacques-Louis David depicts Napoleon placing the crown on the head of the empress. 
Napoleon is exercising and expressing his own authority. He is legitimate because he 
legitimizes his wife, not the people, not God, but Napoleon (Barker 2004, 5). Not only in 
history, but also in today’s politics self-legitimation is ubiquitous in the language, etiquette 
and rituals (Barker 2004, 6).   
Rosanvallon (2011) also discusses legitimacy and states that consent by the people is 
not enough, and on its own does not explain the legitimacy of power. Legitimacy can exist in 
different forms and ways, also ways that are at first glance not particularly democratic, but 
Rosanvallon uses a broader definition of democracy. Legitimacy is flexible and can change 
over time. Rosanvallon describes three new forms of legitimacy that appeared during the 
1980s (Rosanvallon 2011, 6).  These three new forms of legitimacy are: legitimacy of 
impartiality, legitimacy of reflexivity and legitimacy of proximity. Legitimacy of impartiality 
is about institutions not elected by the people, but which can be legitimate because no other 
institution or body can fulfil its function. The Inland Revenue, for example, is not elected by 
the people, but can nevertheless be legitimate because no other organ is allowed or able to 
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carry out its function. The legitimacy of reflexivity means that the democratic system is made 
more complex to include a contingency plan, should a part of the democratic system fail and 
jeopardise democracy and justice. A constitutional court reconsidering the decisions of the 
government in an example of such a safety net. Legitimacy of proximity means that politics 
should also take into account what is peculiar, not only the majority of the people is important 
but also individuals have to be taken into account. These new forms of legitimacy describe 
that political institutions can be legitimate in more ways than just by election of the people.  
Considering Beetham, Barker and Rosanvallon, Barker is the one most concentrating 
most on self-legitimacy. As this thesis will focus on government and Parliament and how they 
consider themselves as an institution, the theory of Barker will be leading in this research, 
since Barker focuses on the activity of legitimation. The activity of legitimacy as explained by 
Barker (2004, 137) is considered very important by government actors (Barker 2004, 17). 
This activity can be observed and comprises all the actions government actors take to 
demonstrate that they are justified in the pattern of actions that they follow (Barker 2004, 30). 
Barker calls this the rituals of rule (Barker 2004, 31). These rituals of rule are mostly 
presented in the public face of the government. Legitimation is conducted in the first place 
within groups and in the second place between groups (Barker 2004, 31). Politicians do and 
say things to legitimize themselves and to justify why they have or don’t have the power to 
take a decision. In a similar way MPs and the government make statements on their own role 
in the decision-making process of military missions. They try to legitimize themselves  within 
their own group, namely in Parliament.  
This research takes a historic intstitutionalist approach. Historical Institutionalism 
focuses mainly on how institutions and decisions now influence the decision-making process 
in the future (Lowndes 2010, 65). Historical institutionalists tend to have a distinct 
perspective on historical development as they rely on path dependency. This means that 
contextual features of a given situation are often inherited from the past (Hall & Taylor 1996, 
941). In their view, institutions are seen as the most important features of the political 
landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a set of paths. 
In this thesis crucial Parliamentary debates in recent history could lead to the decision-making 
process today, meaning that what happened in the past can have great influence today and in 
the future. This could have had great influence in the decision-making process itself and how 
these decisions and the role of the Parliament are legitimized in the case of Dutch military 
missions abroad.  
	 7	
Critical junctures are historical events that have a long-term and transformative impact 
(Soifer 2012, 1572) on the decision-making process. Events that were so important and had 
such an impact that it influenced future decisions were for example a war or a catastrophic 
event. I expect that two critical junctures had such an influence on the decision-making 
process in this research. One of the critical junctures in this thesis is the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992. After these events the most important 
enemy of the Netherlands and the Western world disappeared. As a result debates on the role 
of the military and NATO became important. Would NATO still be important? And is NATO 
still necessary to defend its members? Different authors describe a different or no role for 
NATO in international security because of the shifts in power after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
(Rynning 2011, 173). Not only NATO was an important point of discussion, also the use of 
national forces was discussed. The military services in the western world were downsized. 
However conflicts arose that were overlooked during the Cold War (Noll 2005, 1). In a way 
these conflicts guided NATO members in finding their new role. Peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement became just as important as traditional territory defence. Before the collapse of 
the Soviet Union the Western world feared a new war and therefore decisions on military 
missions were for security reasons carried out before becoming public. The Parliament 
accepted this situation before the end of the Cold War, but as the Soviet Union was changing 
and was thought to be less of a real threat to NATO members Parliaments demanded a bigger 
role and more transparency when deciding on military missions. 
 The other critical juncture is the tragedy of Srebrenica in 1995. The Dutch military 
mission failed to protect the Bosnian civilians against violence in the so-called safe areas. As 
a result approximately 7000 men where deported and murdered. Soon after this tragedy 
questions and Parliamentary debates followed whether the Dutch could have prevented the 
massacre, if the Dutch should have joined the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia under these 
conditions and whether the mission was prepared properly. I expect that such a tragedy in the 
history of Dutch military missions has lead to changes in the role of Parliament in the decision 
making process and the way government and Parliament see their role (Bovend’Eert 1998, 
1595). 
 Ideally these two critical junctures would have a considerable stable period of time 
between them, but since these events succeeded each other so closely, this was not the case. 
Between the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 and the Srebrenica tragedy in 1995 only the 
UNPROFOR mission was discussed in Parliament. Since the first debates about a possible 
mission where held early 1992 before the Soviet Union collapsed it would be possible that 
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these debates interfered with each other and therefore it’s hard to say if the collapse of the 
Soviet Union had effect on the decision-making process. Therefore these two critical 
junctures will be considered as one. To make a distinction between the two critical junctures, 
the events should be mentioned explicitly by the MPs.  
 A third possibility that could have changed the decision making process is a change in 
the balance of power. In 1950 the liberals in Parliament only held 8% of the seats, while in 
2011 the liberals held 27% of the seats in Parliament. The Christian Democrat parties had a 
majority of seats in 1950 and just 21 seats in 2011. Furthermore, the last decade other new 
parties emerged and won a considerable number of seats in Parliament. These changes in the 
balance of power could change the way Parliament thinks about itself. Even if the different 
political parties separately do not change their views it could lead to a different majority 
because of the shift in power.  
 These expectations lead to three possible hypotheses. The first is that the massacre in 
Srebrenica had such a great impact on Dutch politics that it also changed the way MPs think 
about their own role during the decision making process of military missions. The second 
hypothesis is that the fall of the Berlin wall and the Collapse of the Soviet Union changed the 
decision-making process and the third hypothesis is that the changed in Parliament were 
caused by a change of the balance of power.  
 
Method 
 
 
To research the question how and why the role of the Parliament changed in the decision-
making process concerning military missions and to research if this changed because of one 
or a combination of the three hypotheses. The theory of Barker, as discussed earlier, will be 
used. The activity of legitimation in commonly preformed and can be observed perfectly 
during debates. Therefore debates in Parliament are chosen to conduct my research. The 
debates are recorded and are public and this is also the arena where the MPs discuss the most 
important issues among each other.  When a subject is not discussed during Parliamentary 
debates the subject will most likely not be important enough.  
From debates it can be deduced how government and Parliament view their own role 
in the decision-making process and how their perception of their role in the decision-making 
process changes over time.  
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 In this research the sole focus will be on debates between government and Parliament 
related to or directly about military missions, or closely related topics. Plenary debates are the 
core of my research and any other meetings are not included in my research as there was no 
evidence that this was needed to get my research question answered.  
  In this research four different debates in the Second Chamber of Parliament will be 
discussed. Due to time constrains this number of debates was chosen. Discussing more 
debates would not be feasible and beyond the scope of any thesis project. The four different 
debates will consist of discussions and accompanying documents, such as relevant letters and 
reports, about the decision-making process with regard to Dutch military missions. In order to 
get the best understanding of any changes over time two debates were selected on the basis 
that they included ample discussion on the role of Parliament and government in the decision-
making process. After the critical junctures Dutch participation in military missions had 
become more of a hot topic and was therefore more often debated than before the critical 
junctures. 
The first debate discussed will be about the decision of the government to join the 
military mission in Korea in June 1950. In the proceedings of the Second Chamber 
(Proceedings Second Chamber 1950, 2118) comments are made on this decision-making 
process. The Korean War was the first time the Dutch were wending troops for a safety 
mission abroad. The second debate discussed will be the mission in Lebanon. During these 
debates a discussion arose that the government should inform the Parliament beforehand and 
not after the decision to join a military mission (Second Chamber proceedings 1979, 3019). 
These debates can tell something about the way Parliament and government thought about the 
role of Parliament in such a process. Together these are the two main Dutch missions abroad 
before the critical junctures, with the most soldiers deployed and most casualties. As the two 
most important missions it will be likely that these missions will be heavily debated in 
Parliament.   
After the critical junctures two debates between government and Parliament have been 
picked. The first debate is a debate between the Parliament and the government about a 
committee report on the decision making process before the military mission to Srebrenica. It 
is not as the other debates a debate before a mission. During this debate the decision-making 
process is examined by most parties in Parliament and the government. The second debate 
after the critical juncture is the debate will be the police-training mission in Kunduz, 
Afghanistan in 2011. This mission was heavily debated in Parliament and it was the first time 
that a mission was initiated by a motion in Parliament instead of the government. I will 
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discuss the debate that took place after the ‘proposal’ of the government and not the debate at 
the time when motion was tabled, because when the motion was tabled not all parties nor the 
government were informed in such a way they could debate on the subject. The debate that 
took place after the government’s proposal however, was much more informative as both 
government and Parliament were well enough informed to fully address all relevant issues 
during the debate. From such a full debate it should be possible to conclude as to whether the 
decision-making process had changed and find out how Parliament legitimized itself. 
Furthermore it should become clear whether or not self-legitimation as discussed by Barker 
played a role in the legitimation process. Barker argued namely that governments and other 
governmental institutions actively legitimize themselves mostly within their own environment 
like the Parliament. Equally the Parliament by legitimizing itself can claim that it has a 
specific right to rule and make decisions concerning Dutch military missions (Barker 2004, 
136).   
 
Debates in Parliament   
 
Debate on the Korea war (30 June 1950) 
	
Table	1	Source	allocation	of	seats:	
http://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvx6/zetelverdeling_tweede_kamer_1946_heden 
32	
27	
13	
9	
8	
8	 2	
1	
Second	Chamber	1950	
KVP	(catholic	party)	PvdA	(social	democrats)	ARP	(anti	revolutionaries)	CHU	(Christian	Historicals)	VVD	(liberals)	CPN	(communist	party)	SGP	(christian	reformed	party)	MP	Welten	
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On 30 June 1950 the Parliament debated about the Korea War and the decision of the Dutch 
government that it had the intention to join the UN mission in Korea. In 1950 the government 
consisted of the following political parties: KVP (Katholieke Volkspartij), PvdA (Partij van 
de Arbeid), CHU (Christelijk-Historische Unie) and the VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democrtatie). The prime minister at the time was Willem Drees (PvdA).  
 After the Second World War the Soviet Union occupied the northern territory of 
Korea and the United States the southern part. As early as 1948 it became evident that the 
tension between North and South Korea could lead to a civil war. North Korea attacked by 
surprise on 25 June 1950. With the support of a UN military mission the United States 
managed to gain ground. The Dutch military mission was part of the UN military mission.  
 During this debate on the decision, by the government, to join the mission in Korea 
was discussed in detail. The CPN (Communistische Partij van Nederland) took centre stage 
with some controversial statements on the United States. The debate also included some 
interesting statements about the role of the government and Parliament in this decision-
making process.  
 MP Korthals of the VVD mentioned the role of the Parliament in the most explicit in 
this debate. In a question to the government he described the vision of the VVD very clearly. 
He asked the government if the committee of foreign affaires was going to be informed before 
the government made any decisions. MP Korthals stated that it would be desirable if the 
committee could be informed beforehand. According to the MP the committee’s opinion 
would ben valuable to the government and therefore should be heard, but should not be 
binding in any way. Furthermore he clearly stated that the responsibility of the decision 
remains with the government and that the Parliament should not govern. At the beginning of 
his speech MP Korthals is also the only MP who complimented the government on having 
given the information at an early stage. The VVD therefore wished to be informed at an early 
stage but the responsibility has to be with the government (Proceedings Second Chamber 
1950, 2118).   
 MP Klompé represented the biggest party in Parliament, the KVP, in this debate. In 
her speech she mostly concentrated on the importance of the mission itself. Statements on the 
role of the Parliament she did not make directly, but in her speech she noted the importance of 
this debate and the importance of the subject. Another statement she made in her speech was 
that the statement made by the government was a decision and not a proposal, but she never 
suggested a different role for Parliament or government.  
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 MP Tilanus of the CHU and MP Bruins Slot of the ARP (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij) 
both acknowledged the government’s decision and supported it, each in their own way. MP 
Bruins-Slot (ARP) said it was God’s decision to make, in other words not the peoples 
decision, from which you can deduce that he didn’t think that Parliament had a role to play in 
the decision-making process (Proceedings Second Chamber 1950, 2123) 
 The PvdA, the second biggest political party at the time, did not mention the role of 
the Parliament or the government at all. Both MP van der Goes van Naters and later during 
the debate MP de Kadt did not mention it and focused on the lawfulness of the decisions 
made by the Security Council and not by the government.  
 The only real sceptical party was the CPN. MP de Groot’s Communist ideology was 
apparent in his distrust towards the United States as initiator of the intervention. The MP did 
not question that is was a decision that had to be made by the government. He did not want to 
make the decision but advised the government to revise its opinion. From this we can deduce 
that MP de Groot thought that it was was the government’s role to make the decision. 
 Prime Minister Drees, a PvdA politician, reacted to the questions and remarks made 
by the Parliament on the decision. As a reaction to the question of MP Korthals, Prime 
Minister Drees answered that the committee of foreign affairs was not informed beforehand, 
but that it would be desirable to inform the committee before the decision is made when 
possible. On the other hand Prime Minister Drees was very certain about the decision the 
government made. Another distinctive feature was that the Parliament was satisfied with very 
little information. As an answer to the question how big the role of the Dutch military would 
be, Prime Minister Drees answered that it would be modest and small. The Parliament 
accepted and did not question any further.  
 At the end of the debate two motions were tabled. A motion tabled by CPN to let the 
government reconsider its decision was rejected. MP Romme made a motion of order that was 
adopted; this one approved the decision made by the government. In his statement prior to his 
point of order he explained that it was usually not necessary in the Netherlands to approve 
such a decision in Parliament, but since this decision is of international significance the 
Parliament should make clear that they agree on this case.  
 
Debate on the Dutch participation in the UN peace mission in Lebanon (1 February 
1979) 
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Table	2	Source	allocation	of	seats:	
http://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvx6/zetelverdeling_tweede_kamer_1946_heden 
 
The Dutch Second Chamber debated on 1 February 1979 about the UN peace mission in 
Lebanon. In 1977 Cabinet van Agt I was formed and consisted of CDA and VVD.  
 The debate took place after the government made their intention to participate in the 
UN peace mission to Lebanon public. In 1975 a civil war broke out in Lebanon because of 
national tensions. The Muslims in the country were dissatisfied with the privileged position of 
the Christian population. A couple of issues were important during this debate. One of the 
main issues was the use of conscripted soldiers during peace missions. The other much 
debated issue was the role of the Parliament during the decision making process, on which the 
focus will be in this research.  
 The debate started with a statement made by PvdA MP van den Bergh. The 
government’s decision to join the peace mission took him by surprise. The decision was first 
covered by the NOS in their news bulletin and during a NCRV TV broadcast. The 
government issued a letter, but too little information was given according to MP van den 
Bergh. The MP stated that the Parliament should be informed earlier and be given more 
detail. MPs van den Bergh and de Vries (PvdA) tabled a motion, namely that the government 
49	
28	
53	
8	 3	 3	 2	
1	 1	1	 1	
Second	Chamber	1979	CDA	(merged	from	KVP,	CHU,	ARP)	VVD	PvdA	D66	(social	liberal	party)	PPR	(progressive	christian	party	SGP	CPN	DS'70	(split	from	PvdA)	PSP	(paciRist	party)	GPV	(orthodox	protestant	party)	Boerenpartij	(farmers	party)	
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should have informed the Parliament before they made a decision (Proceedings Second 
Chamber 1979, 2939). In this way, so argued the PvdA, the government could have gained as 
much support as possible, which is very important in such cases, because during missions the 
lives of soldiers are at risk. The PvdA did not question the decision to join the mission itself, 
but the way the government acted and bypassed the Parliament was a wrongful act, according 
to the MP.  
 A smaller party, D66 (Democraten 66), expressed similar thoughts, but less critical of 
the government’s handling than the PvdA. MP Brinkhorst devoted a significant part of his 
speech to the role of the Parliament and how it should be. D66 shared the opinion of the PvdA 
that the Parliament should have been informed in advance. On the other hand they emphasize 
that it is the responsibility of the government to govern. MP Brinkhorst did not understand 
why the Parliament is consulted on all kinds of military decisions, such as weapon deliveries 
or important issues at NATO, but is almost completely side-lined during the domestic 
decision-making process on peace missions. According to the MP this could harm the 
relationship between Parliament and government. D66 questioned the government on the 
mission at an earlier stage, but the government’s answers were not satisfactory to MP 
Brinkhorst. The minister of Defence answered namely that it was not always feasible to 
consult the Parliament beforehand and the minister of Foreign Affairs called it not suitable to 
consult the Parliament before a decision is made. D66 did hope that this was the last time that 
such a decision was made without approval of the Parliament. MP Brinkhorst also tabled a 
motion in which he emphasizes the argument above.  
MP Frinking (CDA) stated during his speech that it is of great importance to 
emphasize the responsibility of the government and Parliament. The government has to 
govern and the Parliament has to control the government’s decisions. However, in the case of 
military missions it is more difficult. When the government and other foreign governments or 
international organizations reach an agreement it would be impossible to control the 
government. The only thing you can do is to ask the government and agree to the decision. In 
these cases it is therefore desirable to inform the Parliament beforehand, just to strengthen the 
position of the government, as the MP stated.  
The VVD declared that they agreed with the government in the way they decided to 
join the UN peace mission. MP Blaauw emphasized that he could understand why the 
government did not inform the Parliament beforehand, because they had to make a decision in 
such a short amount of time. The also made clear that the country was shocked by the 
government’s announcement, but the VVD agreed on the government’s decision. Furthermore 
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the VVD focussed on their role to control the government. The MP spoke mainly about the 
lawfulness and the political desirability of the decision.  
The PSP (Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij) with just one seat in Parliament also tabled 
a motion. It wanted the government to revise its decision. As a Pacifist party this motion was 
hardly a surprise, since they opposed any military mission. It was the only political party that 
actually asked the government to revise their decision.   
Minister of Foreign Affairs van der Klaauw (VVD) reacted to different questions and 
comments made during the debate. On the main questions, namely if the Parliament should 
have been informed and consulted at an earlier stage the minister answered that it was 
impossible to inform the Parliament at an earlier stage because of the speed of the decision-
making process and the pressure to decide from outside. The minister argued that the army 
should be informed before the Parliament. Furthermore, the minister questioned the 
desirability to share confidential information with Parliament. The minister was concerned 
that MPs would leak important confidential information to the press.  
The motion tabled by MP Brinkhorst (D66) passed with only two votes against the 
motion. This was remarkable because this motion obliged the government to consult the 
Parliament before a decision to join a UN peace mission is made. Only de Boerenpartij and 
MP van Dam (CDA) voted against this motion. This meant that the government had to consult 
the Parliament before they joined a mission. The decision remains entirely with the 
government, but the consultation is meant to gain support in Parliament. The VVD also 
mentioned that they would only support the motion if the decision remained entirely with the 
government.  
 
Debate about the results of the committee on the decision-making process concerning 
foreign military missions (11 October 2000) 
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Table	3	Source	allocation	of	seats:	
http://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvx6/zetelverdeling_tweede_kamer_1946_heden 
 
On 11 October 2000 the results of the committee on the decision-making process concerning 
military missions were discussed in Parliament. In 2000 the cabinet Kok II consisted of PvdA, 
VVD and D66.  
 After the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 questions arose about the Dutch 
involvement in peacekeeping missions abroad and the role of the Parliament in this decision-
making process. After critical coverage in the media and questions from different MPs, the 
Parliament decided that the Defence Committee should conduct an inquiry to find out whether 
or not the government fully informed Parliament on the mission in Srebrenica. After this 
inquiry the Defence Committee advised the Parliament to create another temporary committee 
to investigate the political decision-making process with regard to participation and 
continuation of peacekeeping missions. The missions to former Yugoslavia should be looked 
at in retrospect. This temporary committee (referred to as Committee Bakker) was created on 
13 April 2000 and handed over their findings on 4 September 2000. As a result of this inquiry 
Parliament debated with Committee Bakker and government during the first two weeks of 
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October. During these debates the results and recommendations of Committee Bakker where 
debated and questioned.  
 Some of the results were heavily debated in Parliament, especially recommendations 
11 to 13. It was common that the government informed Parliament after it made a decision 
and after it informally offered its services to the United Nations or any other international 
organization. After article 100 was added to the Constitution in 2000, the Committee Bakker 
argued that the Second Chamber lost the sole function of control in the case of peacekeeping 
missions. The Committee Bakker advised to inform Parliament at an earlier stage, to ensure 
no commitments were formally made before Parliament was fully informed and had a chance 
to assess the scope and risks involved in any suggested military commitment, as mentioned in 
recommendation 13. The decision-making process before and after the Committee Bakker’s 
recommendations can be found in appendix 1 and 2. The depicted diagrams clearly illustrate 
changes in the decision-making process, namely to now inform the Parliament after an 
informal offer to an International Organization instead of after an official decision in the 
Council of Ministers is made. These recommendations were heavily debated in Parliament, 
because this would mean more power and responsibility for the Parliament with regard to the 
decision to possibly join a military mission.  
 At the start of the debate MP Koenders of the PvdA mentioned at the beginning of his 
speech that this inquiry would never have taken place if the Srebrenica massacre did not 
happen and that this inquiry was the direct result of this massacre. After this observation MP 
Koenders shared his views on recommendations 11 to 13. The PvdA did want to strengthen 
the position of the Parliament, but had clear doubts on the reasoning and the 
recommendations the committee made, especially on recommendation number 13. MP 
Koenders proposed to make formal arrangements to inform the Parliament at a certain time. 
This could, according to MP Koenders, strengthen the role of the Parliament and could 
contribute to a joint-responsibility of Parliament and government. At the same time MP 
Koenders warned Parliament that this recommendation could disperse the governments 
responsibilit. Furthermore, the Parliament should be careful not to govern instead, as that 
would clash with its function to check and challenge the work of the government. During his 
speech Koenders also went into discussion with MP van Middelkoop (GPV/RPF), on the 
question if an informal right of consent existed (Proceedings Second Chamber 2000, 11-714). 
MP Koenders thought that although a joint responsibility existed, there was no informal or 
formal right of consent.  
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 MP Wilders (VVD) made the next statement. At that time MP Wilders was still a 
member of the VVD and was spokesman on Defense. Like MP Koenders, the VVD also 
stated that there were important lessons important to learn from Srebrenica. For example 
when in 1993 the then Prime Minister Lubbers offered Dutch military services to the UN to 
join the mission in Srebrenica, while at the time it was unclear if deployment of troops was 
feasible (Proceedings Second Chamber 2000, 11.716). In his statement he was very clear that 
the VVD was in favor of a clear separation of powers as Montesquieu described it. The VVD 
mentioned that the Parliament should be informed after the final decision is made, because 
only then the Parliament can execute its power to control the decisions of the government.  
 CDA MP van der Knaap shared the Government’s opinion that the Parliament and the 
Government have a joint responsibility in the decision-making process on military missions. 
And he thought it was very important that the government informs the Parliament beforehand. 
In this way the Parliament can take its responsibility. During this debate the media spoke 
extensively about the possibility for the Netherlands to deploy soldiers in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. The meetings between Dutch ministers and the ministers of the United States and 
Canada as well as meetings with the Secretary General of the UN were elaborately discussed 
in the media. MP van der Knaap made the remark that ‘the media is better informed about a 
possible military mission then the MPs’ (Proceedings Second Chamber 2000, 11.u736). 
During an earlier debate MP van der Knaap tried to get more information from the 
government at an earlier stage, but a majority in Parliament prevented this debate from taking 
place. The government itself was not to keen either to inform Parliament because of the little 
information the Prime Minister gave. Furthermore MP van der Knaap believed that the 
Parliament should be informed earlier to avoid information leaking to the media. The MP also 
asked the government if it shared the opinion of the Committee Bakker that the Parliament 
not only should control the government but also should share responsibility in the decision-
making process on military missions. It can be derived from the debate that MP van der 
Knaap was in favor of recommendation 13, as opposed to PvdA and VVD.   
 During this debate MP van Middelkoop (GPV/RPF) took a leading role. Already years 
before this debate the he advocated joint responsibility and a formal right of consent and also 
during this debate he advocated this right. Although the GPV was a small political party in 
Parliament his interruptions influenced debate and led to more discussion on the role of 
Parliament.  
 MP Vos (GroenLinks) stated that she was upset by the results committee’s results. She 
stated that both Parliament and Government made mistakes during the decision-making 
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process conercering the mission to Srebrenica. GroenLinks considered it undesirable that the 
Parliament only played a minor role during the decision-making process and urged that the 
Parliament’s role should be more substantive. Like GroenLinks, D66 MP Dittrich argued that 
the Parliament should learn its lessons from Srebrenica. Therefore the government should 
inform the Parliament at an earlier stage.  
 All political parties acknowledged that this inquiry and debate were a direct result of 
the Sebrenica massacre, and lessons should be learned from this tragedy. The Government 
shared the opinion of  the Parliament’s opinion on this matter. 
 	
Debate about the police-training mission in Afghanistan (27 January 2011) 
 
	
Table	4	Source	allocation	of	seats:	
http://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvx6/zetelverdeling_tweede_kamer_1946_heden 
The debate on the police-training mission to Kunduz took place on 27 January 2011. After the 
elections in 2010 a new cabinet was formed. This was the first time the Netherlands was 
governed by a minority coalition of CDA and VVD, with the support of the PVV (Partij voor 
de Vrijheid). Mark Rutte (VVD) had become Prime Minister at the time.  
 As seen in earlier debates, the government usually decided that it wanted to join a 
mission. After this decision the government informed the Parliament and a debate followed in 
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Parliament. This time the situation was slightly different. When the Uruzgan mission was not 
extended and the fourth Balkenende Cabinet resigned, D66 and GroenLinks felt the need to 
remain active in Afghanistan. They tabled a motion whether it would be possible to deploy a 
police-training mission in Afghanistan. This motion was named motion Peters/Pechtold. 
When a couple months later the new cabinet was in office, the cabinet stated in its cabinet 
agreement that they intended to implement motion Peters/Pechtold. After the government’s 
decision it drafted a letter based on article 100 and did sent it to Parliament. The letter was 
sent in January 2011 and series of debates followed, the one discussed here was the last of the 
debates between Parliament and Government.  During these debates it became clear that the 
government not only wanted to inform the Parliament, but the government also wanted to win 
the consent of the Parliament before it made a decision. Since the PVV wasn’t supportive, the 
had to search for support from other parties. Clear opponents of the proposal were PvdA, 
PVV and SP. GroenLinks was undecided and it remained unclear for a long time if they were 
in favour of this proposal. Until the end it remained unclear if GroenLinks supported the 
mission. Its consent was so important to the Government that it revised their proposal several 
times during the week before this debate took place. To this new decision-making process MP 
Pechtold reacted as followed; ‘the Parliament took an extra responsibility’ (Proceedings 
Second Chamber 2011, 45-4-16).   
 MP Blok (VVD) started the debate with his statement. He acknowledged that it is the 
hardest decision for an MP to send soldiers abroad. Since the lives of people are at stake he 
repeated that such were always hard. After remarks on terrorism he continued by saying that 
the Parliament took a courageous decision by initiating this mission. Although in an earlier 
meeting his colleague MP Nicolaï (VVD) doubted the Parliament was governing 
(Proceedings Second Chamber 2010, 79-6738). Throughout his statement MP Blok called  the 
decision to join the police-training mission a government’s proposal. At the end of his 
statement he asked all his colleagues to support this proposal.  
 The next statement was made by MP Cohen (PvdA). He opposed the decision of the 
government because he was afraid that this mission wouldn’t be a civil police-training 
mission, but a military mission. In contrast to the VVD MP Cohen did not call this decision a 
proposal but a decision throughout his statement. He did not touch on the decision-making 
process of the government any further, but was mainly focussed on why he opposed the 
mission. 
 MP Wilders was during his statement attacked because he did not support the decision 
of the government, although his party officially supports the government because of the 
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minority position of the government. Furthermore he did not touch on the position of the 
government and Parliament.  
 CDA member MP van Haersma Buma followed with a statement on the position of 
the CDA on the police-training mission. The MP was not concise in his words on the mission 
because he called the letter based on article 100 a proposal by the government, but also as a 
decision a couple of minutes later. When MP van Hearsma Buma called letter based on article 
100 a decision he also mentioned and emphasized that would be impossible to consider a 
decision of the government in only half an hour, since MP Cohen (PvdA) decided on the 
matter only half an hour after the government made the accouchement. He also stated that the 
CDA only could make this decision if it considered all details and if Prime Minister Rutte 
would answer all CDA’s questions. 
  The other parties also mentioned the role of Parliament and Government. MP 
Rouvoet (ChristenUnie) stated that these kinds of missions are a very hard decision for every 
MP, but such decisions come with the job. MP Pechtold (D66) shared the opinion that this 
decision is a big responsibility of Parliament. Furthermore he stated that this decision-making 
process was initiated by the Parliament and not by Government. By initiating this mission the 
Parliament took an extra responsibility. MP Pechtold ended his statement by saying ‘if this 
debate leads to sending Dutch soldiers and trainers to Afghanistan’ (Proceedings Second 
Chamber 2011, 45-4-17), from which could be derived that it’s the Parliaments decision to 
make.   
 Prime Minister Rutte reacted to all questions and remarks. He clearly stated that the 
letter based on Article 100 was a ‘proposal’ of Government and not a ‘decision’ by the 
Government. He repeated this various times throughout his speech. He tried to persuade the 
MPs to support his mission; he said let’s ‘give it a shot’ (Proceedings Second Chamber 2011, 
45-4-30). Information was only given in case he could persuade MPs to support his proposal.  
Because GroenLinks held a key position, he directly asked its support by addressing MP Sap 
(GroenLinks) directly (Poceedings Second Chamber 2011, 45-4-28). It was clear that the 
Prime Minister did want the consent of Parliament first before a final decision was made. 
 PvdA and SP did initiate a motion at the end of the debate and asked the government 
to reconsider its decision and not deploy this mission in Kunduz. Prime Minister Rutte 
discouraged the MPs to vote in favour of this motion. The motion was rejected and the 
government won the consent of Parliament.  
 During the debate MP’s Blok (VVD) and van Haersma-Buma (CDA) both stated that 
we should not forget the Srebrenica massacre and should keep this in mind during the 
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decision-making process. Prime-Minister Rutte (VVD) agreed with both MPs. Even sixteen 
years after the Srebrenica massacre several MPs made statements on this dreadful event.  
   
The debates on the decision-making process Parliament discussed. 		
In the theoretical framework I mentioned two critical junctures, which were also the first 
mentioned hypotheses: first the collapse of the Soviet Union and second the Srebrenica 
massacre. These events were considered that important that they could change the view of 
MPs and government about their role in the decision-making process.  It was expected that the 
role of Parliament became more substantive after these two critical junctures. The third 
hypothesis is that the role of the Parliament in the decision-making process changed because 
of a change in the balance of power in Dutch politics.  
 To test the first hypothesis the collapse of the Soviet Union should be mentioned 
explicitly during the debates on the results of Committee Bakker and the Kunduz police-
training mission. This could also be called the end of the Cold War or the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. Only MP van Middelkoop (GPV/RPF) slightly touched upon the subject during the 
debate on the results of Committee Bakker. The other MPs did not mention the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in any way during both debates. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
hardly mentioned it can be assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not a very 
important motive to change the decision-making process during these debates. From these 
results it can be deduced that the collapse of the Soviet Union is most likely not the cause of 
the change of the role of the Parliament on military missions. 
 The second hypothesis is that the Srebrenica massacre had such an impact that the role 
of the Parliament would change because of this occasion. Like the test on the first hypothesis 
it is important that MPs or the government made direct references to the massacre in 
Srebrenica. In both debates the massacre in Srebrenica was elaborately mentioned. In 2000 
Committee Bakker was established to learn lessons from the massacre in Srebrenica, 
especially on the question how the Dutch decision-making process could be improved on 
military missions. The Srebrenica massacre was also discussed at great length by MPs during 
the debate on the results of Committee Bakker. All MPs mentioned the massacre in 
Srebrenica and, in this context, the importance to improve the decision-making process. MP 
Wilders (VVD) looked back on the decision-making process of the Srebrenica mission and 
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the mistakes made by then third Lubbers Cabinet and Parliament. MP Koenders (PvdA) 
explicitly mentioned that Committee Bakker was a direct result of the Srebrenica massacre. 
D66 spokesman MP Dittrich argued for a parliamentary inquiry as soon as all investigations 
on Srebrenica were ready. He also considered the massacre in Srebrenica as a painful part of 
Dutch history that would justify such a Parliamentary inquiry. MP van Middelkoop 
(GPV/RPF) also reflected on the decision-making process during the mission in Srebrenica 
and argued that the Dutch Parliament should learn from this situation. MP van der Knaap 
(CDA) also argued that more information is needed and a Parliamentary inquiry would be 
preferable.  
 The debate on Kunduz in 2011 was not a debate about the decision-making process as 
such, but a debate about a police-training mission in Afghanistan. The Srebrenica massacre 
was therefore less debated in Parliament but nevertheless different MPs and the government 
mentioned it. MP Blok (VVD) reminded the Parliament of the massacre in Srebrenica. He 
argued that the Parliament had learned its lessons and they should take care that this should 
never happen again in Dutch military. CDA considered it is also very important that the 
Parliament should have learned its lessons from the Srebrenica massacre as MP van Haersma-
Buma stated. Prime Minister Rutte (VVD) reacted to van MP van Haersma-Buma and agreed 
with both MPs that Government and Parliament should keep Srebrenica in mind and that they 
should implement all lessons learned. Although the Srebrenica massacre was not debated as 
extensively as in 2001 it was clearly mentioned. Almost sixteen years after the Srebrenica 
massacre it was still a topic in Parliament and mentioned as the event that changed the way of 
thinking in Parliament.  
 The Srebrenica massacre turned out to be an important event that changed the way the 
Parliament thinks about its own role. Inquires were insisted by MPs because the Parliament 
should learn its lessons and the Parliament should never let it happen again.  Even sixteen 
years later it was still clear that the Srebrenica massacre made a huge impression on 
Parliament.  
 The third hypothesis is that the legitimation of Parliament changed because the 
balance of power changed. The major political ideologies in the Netherlands are the Christian 
Democrats, Social Democrats and Liberals. Over the years these three main ideologies hold  
majority of seats in Parliament, even in 2011 when the right-wing nationalist party PVV won 
24 seats. Although the three main ideologies still hold a majority of seats in Parliament the 
balance of power did change considerably. In 1950 the VVD only hold 8 out of 100 seats in 
Parliament and the other liberal party D66 did not even exist. In 2011 these two parties 
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together hold 41 out of 150 seats. The Christian Democrat parties lost power over the years. 
In 1950 the KVP, CHU and ARP combined did hold 54 out of 100 seats in Parliament, CDA 
only hold 21 seats in 2011. The allocation of seats in Parliament changed considerably and 
therefore the balance of power shifted. This could also cause the change that Parliament 
gained power in recent history. Even if political parties individually did not change its views 
the majority vote could have changed. Did parties change their view on its power on military 
missions? The major political ideologies did change in the way they think about the power of 
the Parliament in military missions.  
 During the first debate on the Korean mission in 1950 most of the important parties 
did not question the role of the government. KVP, CHU, PvdA and ARP all stated that this 
was a decision by the government. The VVD however wished to be informed at an earlier 
stage, but also emphasized that the Parliament should not govern and that he did not mention 
this because he wanted to change the responsibility of Government.  
 During the debate on the Lebanon mission in 1979 both CDA and PvdA argued that 
the Government should inform the Parliament before the decision is made. PvdA argued for 
slightly more influence then CDA, it kept emphasizing that it is a decision made by the 
government, but it would strengthen the position of the government if it informed the 
Parliament at an earlier stage. Although the VVD asked for early information during the 
debate on the Korean mission, this time the VVD did not agree with the rest of the parties to 
be informed in advance. On the other hand the VVD supported the motion of D66 just like 
most parties. This motion stated that the Parliament should be informed before the decision in 
the council of ministers is made. Minister of Foreign Affairs van der Klaauw (VVD) was 
much more critical on the motion and clearly did not trust the Parliament with confidential 
information on military missions.   
 During the debate in 2000 on the results of Committee Bakker the views of the parties 
in Parliament were elaborately discussed. CDA as well as D66 advocated a more influential 
role for Parliament and wanted to be informed about a possible decision of Government 
beforehand. PvdA and VVD were more reserved on the role of Parliament on military 
missions. PvdA wanted to strengthen the role of parliament, but also emphasized that the 
government should govern. If the parliament would be informed before a decision on military 
missions is made the parliament risked to govern instead of the Government, and therefore 
opposed recommendation 13 made by Commission Bakker. MP Wilders (VVD) did not want 
to change the role of Parliament at all. He argued that the Government should govern and 
Parliament should check and challenge the Government.    
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 The last debate in 2011 on the Afghanistan mission was very different from the other 
debates, because the mission was initiated by Parliament and it was the first time that the 
Netherlands experienced a minority Government. Although it was officially a decision by the 
government and had to be checked and challenged by Parliament, most parties in Parliament 
spoke about a proposal instead of a decision of the government. The initiative and power was 
with Parliament. None of the main political parties argued an official right of consent on 
military missions although this could be a possibility since informal right of consent already 
existed in 2011.  
 The views of the main ideologies in Parliament changed often but a trend cannot be 
observed. As seen in Table 1 below there is no concise position of the different parties, except 
that none of the parties argued for official right of consent after an informal right to vote was 
introduced after the committee Bakker in 2000. Since none of the parties have a consistent 
opinion the shift in the balance of power cannot be argued as one of the causes of the change 
in power of the Parliament on military missions. VVD, for example, voted in 1979 in favor of 
motion Brinkhorst, in 2000 it did not want to be informed before a decision is made on 
military missions, motion Brinkhorst called exactly for this early information. 
 
 1950 1979 2000 2011 
PvdA - + - - 
CDA  - + + - 
VVD + -/+ - - 
D66  + + - 
 
Table 5: The position of the parties on their power in Parliament. + means a party wants more power for 
the Parliament, - means a party does not want to change the situation or wants to restrict the power of the 
Parliament. In 1979 the VVD argued against more power for the Parliament but voted in favor of the 
Brinkhorst motion. In 1950 CDA where the parties KVP, ARP and CHU and D66 did not exist yet. 	 	
Conclusion 
 
This research was on how and why the role of Parliament changed on the decision-making 
process concerning military missions. Since the first mission to Korea in 1950 Parliament 
gained power in the decision-making process on military missions. It demanded a 
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substantially stronger role, but it seems that this power also had its limits, because none of the 
parties belonging to one of the main political ideologies wants to opt for an official right of 
consent. The tendency that Parliament gained more power started when the Brinkhorst motion 
was tabled and agreed upon in 1979. Even though the Brinkhorst motion was appointed, the 
situation did not change until 2000, Parliament would still be informed after Government 
made the decision. This changed rapidly after the Srebrenica massacre. The Srebrenica 
massacre had a major impact on the power Parliament wanted and gained. The results of the 
Committee Bakker where agreed upon by a big majority of votes and successfully led to an 
informal right of consent. This means that the government has a joint responsibility with 
Parliament and the Parliament will be informed before a definite decision to join a military 
mission is made, the Parliament is therefore involved in the decision-making process. The 
Srebrenica massacre was mentioned by MPs as one of the most important reasons for this 
change. Even sixteen years later MPs and Prime-Minister Rutte referred to this tragedy as an 
important example to keep in mind when Parliament decided on the police-training mission in 
Afghanistan.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1  
Table	6.	The	decision-making	process	after	the	advise	of	the	committee	Bakker	(List	of	questions	and	answers	2000,65)	
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Appendix 2  
Table	7.	The	decision-making	process	before	the	Committee	Bakker,	Doctrine	Puclicatie	Deel	III,	Koninklijke		Landmacht	
(list	of	questions	and	answers	2000,	64)	
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